Introduction
Large, income-decreasing or negative special items often signify complex and unusual firm events, such as organizational restructurings and declines in the value of fixed assets. Such events are generally not regarded as frequently recurring, and are expected to have only transitory implications for earnings. Our paper posits that accounting properties, in particular conservatism and its association with managerial decisions, influence cross-sectional variation in the persistence of large negative special items.
To determine when financial statement disclosures suggest components are "unusual and nonrecurring" we rely on Standard and Poors' categorization (in the COMPUSTAT database) of earnings components as special items. 1 Special items can be viewed as an attempt by COMPUSTAT to differentiate between income components based on persistence. COMPUSTAT's classification is largely consistent with that of other market participants. For example, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) find that special items defined by COMPUSAT are highly correlated with earnings items excluded by analysts as they attempt to compute a measure of recurring income that can be used for
valuation.
An understanding of the persistence of negative special items is useful for assessing future profitability. Burgstahler et al. (2002) provide evidence suggesting that investors do not fully understand the future earnings implications of special items. Press accounts and academic articles raise concerns about the prevalence and predicted 1 Page 282-283 of the Compustat manual (2003) list some 23 items categorized as "Special Items" by Compustat. These items are chosen because they are unusual or nonrecurring. Any item that appears every year for the last three years is reclassified into "non operating expense." The only items not subject to reclassification are items specifically called "Restructuring/Reorganization", "Special", or "Non-recurring". Thus by designating items as "restructuring", "special" or "non-recurring", managers influence the Compustat categorization.
earnings effects of special items. Skinner (2008) notes that aggregate special items totaled -$327 billion in 2001 and that special items are increasingly common. According to a Merrill Lynch analyst, "So many chunks of earnings are smoothed out by companies claiming certain items should be overlooked as one-time events. Special items are so prevalent now that they're not special anymore..." (Fowler, 2006) . Our paper investigates whether predictable variation in special items persistence depends on the properties of accounting and the implications of these properties for managerial decisions.
We propose that accounting conservatism, in particular the extent to which bad news is reflected in earnings in a timelier manner relative to good news, affects the timeseries properties of special items. This relation can exist if greater conservatism implies that managers recognize bad news in a timelier manner than good news, via special items such as asset write-downs and restructuring charges. Asymmetrically timely loss recognition implies that the recognition of bad news is less likely to be gradual and spread over future time periods unlike that of good news. Instead, earnings will attempt to capture anticipated losses in future cash flows, generating large negative special items that are transitory with respect to future earnings.
Further, as Ball (2001) and Watts (2003) point out, recognizing bad news in a more asymmetrically timely manner draws attention to loss-making projects and imposes costs on managers by affecting their earnings-based compensation. As a consequence, conservatism prompts managers to terminate loss-making projects early, leading to reversal of the losses. Since negative special items represent both the recognition of losses from current projects (for example, via asset write-downs) and managerial actions to reverse such losses (for example, via restructuring charges), we expect negative special items reported by conservative firms to be more transitory.
A second reason to observe significantly large, negative special items is strategic reporting of persistent expenses as special to smooth operating income, or income before special items (see, for example, Elliott and Hana 1996 , MacVay 2006 , Reidl and Srinivasan 2007 . Strategic reporting involves the misclassification of recurring expenses as special in an effort to overstate current operating income and would generate more persistent negative special items. 2 If managers in firms with greater expected conservatism experience greater pressure to reverse losses reported in earnings as special items, we expect that they are less likely to classify recurring operating expenses as "special". Thus existence of strategic reporting can contribute to the negative relation between expected conservatism and negative-special-items persistence.
Using the technique discussed in Khan and Watts (2007) , we use size, book-tomarket, and leverage to estimate a model of cross-sectional variation in conservatism defined as the asymmetric timeliness of annual earnings. Based on historical coefficient estimates and beginning-of-year firm characteristics, we predict the extent of conservatism and place firm-years in quintiles based on predicted conservatism. We then measure variation in the persistence of large negative special items across these predicted conservatism quintiles. We expect firms with higher predicted conservatism will be more likely to report special items that are more transitory and more highly correlated with contemporaneous news (that is, returns).
Findings We find that even though firms with high predicted conservatism are by selection more asymmetrically timely with respect to negative returns, they are no more likely to report significantly large negative special items. Nor are their negative special items any larger in magnitude as a percentage of sales, on average. However, the large negative special items of firms with higher predicted conservatism are more highly associated with current and previous year's returns. More importantly, when investigating a sample of firms that report significantly large negative special items, we find that increases in the magnitude of negative special items, hereafter referred to as special items decreases, tend to revert more quickly for firms with higher expected conservatism. 3 Our results further indicate that the lower special items persistence of more conservative firms cannot be completely explained by generally reduced persistence of all earnings components for such firms.
We run additional tests to understand the influence of strategic misclassification and incentives to reverse losses on the relation between conservatism and special items persistence. We investigate whether the lower special items persistence of less conservative firms arises because of strategic classification of recurring expenses as special in order to just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (MacVay 2006) . 4 We remove firm-years whose reported operating earnings just meet or beat commonly discussed thresholds in the literature. We also exclude firm-years whose special items convert operating profits into net losses and operating income increases into net income declines.
5
Even with the exclusion of these firm-years, we continue to find a strong negative relation between negative-special-items persistence and predicted conservatism.
In further analyses, we test the association between current special items and future sales, the component of future net income least likely to be affected by strategic reporting of special items. We find that the negative special items of the most conservative firms are the most highly associated with future sales declines, as well as future operating expense declines. The evidence is consistent with the special charges of firms with high expected conservatism representing the termination of unprofitable projects.
Collectively the results suggest that while opportunistic reporting of special items to meet/beat earnings targets can potentially contribute to the cross-sectional variation in special items persistence, it is not the sole factor driving our results. Rather, negative special items are more likely to represent the recognition and remediation of operating problems by management when firms are more asymmetrically timely.
Finally, in an attempt to capture the special items that are more likely to reflect the effects of asymmetrically timely loss recognition, we focus specifically on asset write-downs and restructuring charges. For a reduced sample of firms with data available on COMPUSTAT since 2001, we find confirming evidence that the persistence of asset 5 In these firms, the trends in operating income indicate better firm performance than those in net income. It is thus possible that the negative special items in such firms include recurring expense items that reflect strategic reporting considerations. Reidl and Srinivasan (2007) also argue that the propensity to engage in earnings baths is likely to be disproportionately greater among such firms.
write-downs and restructuring charges exhibits a negative association with predicted conservatism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the link between conservatism and special items persistence in greater detail. In Section 3, we present the predictive model for expected conservatism. Section 4 presents our sample and descriptive statistics, and in Section 5 we present our main results. Section 6 concludes.
The Link Between Conservatism and Special Items Persistence
Basu (1997) defines conservatism as the imposition of stricter verification standards for recognizing good news as gains in financial statements than bad news as losses. This definition implies conservative firms will be characterized by greater timeliness of earnings with respect to bad news than with respect to good news, a phenomenon referred to as asymmetric timeliness. Basu (1997) also predicts that asymmetrically timely recognition causes losses to be more transitory than gains.
Deferring the recognition of good news until it is verifiable implies that current earnings recognize only the verifiable portion of the news. The remainder is deferred for future recognition. Thus, when current earnings are relatively high due to partial recognition of contemporaneously received good news, subsequent earnings are also expected to be high due to future recognition of the deferred component. This process generates persistence of earnings gains.
In contrast, timely recognition of bad news implies the capitalization of contemporaneously received bad news about future cash flow losses in current earnings, in the form of timely asset write-offs, restructuring charges or other loss items. Thus, timelier recognition implies that bad news recognition is less spread out over time.
Hence currently recognized losses have lower persistence. Basu (1997) finds empirically that gains are more persistent than losses and conjectures that this difference is due to conservatism, but does not directly test this link. Ball (2001) and Watts (2003) discuss the role of conservatism in addressing agency issues between shareholders and managers. Managers bear personal costs in abandoning failing investments and strategies, because such actions amount to an admission of poor investment decisions. Exercising the abandonment option on projects that generate future negative cash flows potentially reduces current reported income, and can reduce managers' wealth via "… bonuses, reappointment, promotion, reputation and prestige…" (Ball 2001) . Ball (2001) proposes that timely recognition of bad news in earnings can draw the attention of the board to loss-making projects and facilitate better monitoring of managers' incentives to conceal information about such projects. Thus, recognizing bad news in earnings in a timelier manner can counter the private benefits that managers extract from losing projects by increasing the cost of delayed termination, because managerial compensation is often linked to earnings performance.
Large negative special items often include asset write-downs and restructuring charges, which reflect timely recognition of losses, as well as timely managerial responses to loss-making projects. Greater capitalization of future cash flow losses in earnings, together with timelier managerial intervention to reverse losses implies that negative special items of more conservative firms are likely to be less persistent.
A second factor affecting the incidence of special items discussed in the literature is strategic classification of persistent expense items by managers. Managers can classify persistent negative components of earnings as special items in an attempt to mislead investors about the magnitude of sustainable earnings. A substantial literature provides evidence that managers are strategic in their identification of special income-increasing versus income-decreasing items (Kinney and Trezevant 1997 , Schrand and Walther 2000 , McVay 2006 , Reidl and Srinivasan 2007 .
Researchers and practitioners concerned about strategic reporting of special items have pointed to evidence that large special items tend to be negative and a substantial number of firms report negative special items in successive years. Elliot and Hanna, 1996, McVay (2006) and Reidl and Srinivasan (2007) note that the designation of recurring expense items in the income statement as special is a potential method of earnings management. The misclassification of 'normal' operating items implies that special items can contain recurring operating expenses. These recurring expenses can possibly be classified as special again the following year, or appear as normal operating expenses if managers lack incentives and/or flexibility to classify them as special in the following year. In either case, strategic reporting would generate negative special items that are persistent with respect to future net income.
It is possible that predicted conservatism is associated with the extent of strategic classification of special items. Extant literature (MacVay 2006, Reidl and Srinivasan 2007) suggests that the strategic classification of special items is most pronounced when firms are close to earnings benchmarks. We investigate whether the cross-sectional variation we document is driven by firms close to earnings benchmarks commonly discussed in the literature.
If we observe cross-sectional variation in negative-special-items persistence as predicted among firms not close to earnings benchmarks, then it is unlikely that our results are driven by an association between expected conservatism and incentives to just meet or beat benchmarks. Instead, the results would suggest that if there is variation in strategic reporting with expected conservatism, it arises because the pressure to reverse losses reported in special items generally restricts managers in more conservative firms from classifying recurring operating expenses as special.
Estimation of Predicted Conservatism of Earnings
Our estimation of predicted conservatism follows the technique in Khan and Watts (2007) , modified for our exercise. Specifically, we use the findings and arguments in existing literature based on a theory of conservatism to predict the relation between conservatism and three key firm characteristics: leverage, book-to-market and size. We use these relations to predict variation in conservatism as a function of these beginningof-year characteristics. We begin with a discussion of the hypothesized effect of these firm characteristics on the aspect of conservatism we are primarily interested in, the asymmetric timeliness of earnings.
Leverage
A large body of literature discusses the agency problems that arise between shareholders and debt-holders, due to (a) debt-holders' asymmetric payoff structure with respect to the value of the firm and (b) shareholders' limited liability (see for example, Galai and Masulis 1976 and Myers 1977 Zhang (2008) provides evidence that firms whose earnings are more asymmetrically timely bear a lower ex ante cost of debt (via lower interest rates but not via covenants that are less tight). On experiencing extreme negative returns, these firms are likely to violate debt covenants more quickly, resulting in an earlier transfer of control to debt-holders. The results in Beatty, Weber and Yu (2008) suggest that use of conservative adjustments to net worth in debt covenants and financial reporting conservatism are used as complements in addressing the agency costs of debt contracting.
We expect that the greater the importance of debt in the firm's capital structure, the greater is the severity of the agency problems between debt-holders and shareholders and consequently, the greater the debt-contracting demand for asymmetrically timely earnings, ceteris paribus. Further, recall that book value of equity is hypothesized to reflect separable net asset values. Therefore, the greater the ratio of debt to book value, the more concerned debt-holders are likely to be about monitoring future declines in book value, given their asymmetric payoffs. Thus, we expect greater leverage to be associated with greater asymmetric timeliness of future earnings with respect to bad news versus good news.
Book-to-market
A greater portion of the equity value of low book-to-market (BTM) firms consists of unrecorded assets, such as rents and unverifiable increases in the value of separable net assets. As Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) point out, the composition of future returns is likely to reflect the initial composition of equity value. In particular, if a low BTM firm experiences negative stock returns (or bad news), a large proportion of the decrease is likely due to decreases in the value of rents and/or unrecorded separable asset values.
The unrecorded assets of low BTM firms arise because these firms are likely to have deferred the benefits of rent-generating expenditures such as R&D, while recognizing the expenses upfront, or because they have been asymmetrically timely in the past in recognizing changes in the value of separable net assets. Because these assets
were not recorded when they were created, declines in their values will also not be recognized in the financial statements. Similarly, if a low BTM firm experiences positive stock returns (or good news), a large proportion of the increase is likely due to an increase in rents and/or unverifiable increases in separable asset values that will not be recorded in the financial statements.
In sum, for low BTM firms, timely recognition of both future gains and future losses is unlikely. Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) provide evidence that the net empirical effect is a positive relation between beginning BTM and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. This effect is supported by the results of Beaver and Ryan (2005) and Pae, Thornton, and Welker (2005) . Thus we expect future asymmetric timelines to exhibit a positive relation with beginning-of-period book-to-market.
Firm size
A number of reasons exist for a negative relation between firm size and asymmetric timeliness. LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that firms with greater information asymmetry between managers and investors are likely to report more conservatively, and information asymmetry is more severe in smaller firms. Thus, earnings of smaller firms are expected to respond in a more asymmetrically timely manner to the information in negative returns.
An alternate explanation for the negative relation between size and asymmetric timeliness is provided by Givoly et al. (2007) . They argue that the aggregation of offsetting news items by the financial reporting system reduces the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. They posit that observed asymmetric timeliness is lower for larger firms because the earnings and returns of large firms represent an aggregate response to individual news items, while the returns and earnings of smaller firms are more likely to reflect an individual news item.
We thus expect larger firms to exhibit lower asymmetric timeliness of earnings, consistent with both LaFond and Watts (2008) and Givoly et al (2007) . Recall that we also predict that lower asymmetric timeliness will be associated with more persistent special items. By suggesting that larger firms can report timely and transitory loss recognitions without exhibiting asymmetric timeliness, the argument by Givoly et al. (2007) works against our finding a negative relation between our measure of predicted asymmetric timeliness and the persistence of special items.
3.4
Formulating the predicted conservatism score Basu (1997) measures the asymmetric timeliness of earnings with the following regression:
In the equation (1), E t represents income before extraordinary items in year t, P t-1
represents the market value of equity at the beginning of year t, RET t is the 12-month buy-and-hold return beginning the fourth month of the fiscal year, and DR t is an indicator variable set equal to one if RET t < 0 and equal to zero otherwise. β captures the timeliness of earnings with respect to positive returns and γ captures the asymmetric timeliness of earnings with respect to negative returns.
As in Khan and Watts (2007) , we allow earnings timeliness with respect to good news and the asymmetric timeliness with respect to bad news to vary with leverage (LEV), book-to-market (BTM), and size (SIZE). Specifically, β and γ are expressed as following:
In addition, we allow k and η in equation (1) to vary with LEV, BTM and SIZE.
Thus, we express k and η as:
Substituting (2), (3), (4) and (5) in equation (1), we get the following equation: 
In estimating the equation (6) via regression, SIZE t-1 is the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of year t, LEV t-1 is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of equity at the beginning of year t and BTM t-1 is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the beginning of year t. All other variables are as previously defined.
The above regression is estimated in the cross-section every year. Note that the asymmetric timeliness of any firm in a given year is given by
. Because λ 0 does not vary across firms in a given year, we construct the following score to measure cross-sectional variation in asymmetric timeliness across firms in a given year:
Our objective is to predict cross-sectional variation in asymmetric timeliness, which is a measure of the imposition of asymmetric verification standards in any given year, and not the total understatement induced in book value due to the imposition of these standards over a period of time (Roychowdhury and Watts 2006) . Thus, while we refer to C_SCORE as expected conservatism, it captures cross-sectional variation in a specific implication of conservatism, the asymmetric timeliness of earnings (referred to by Khan and Watts 2007 as conservatism flow).
Sample and Descriptive Statistics

Partitioning firm-years based on predicted conservatism
We begin with the intersection of 123,491 firm years in COMPUSTAT and CRSP with data available on earnings, market value of equity, book value of equity, leverage and returns over the periods 1975 to 2004. In Table 1 weights estimated with the current information set, and also allows for variation in the weights over time. positively with leverage and book-to-market and negatively with size. The weights on LEV, BTM and SIZE are of consistent sign across all rolling intervals but there appears to be substantial variation through time, particularly for LEV and SIZE. The positive weight on LEV seems to have declined in magnitude over time, whereas the negative one on SIZE has increased in magnitude. The positive coefficient on book-to-market exhibits less variation through time. Table 3 presents the results of estimating the Basu asymmetric timeliness regression for every quintile of C_SCORE using the Fama-Macbeth specification. The asymmetric timeliness coefficient is 0.5289 for the highest quintile of C_SCORE, around four times that in the bottom quintile (0.1308). Further, the increase in the asymmetric timeliness coefficient from the lowest to the top quintile of C_SCORE is monotonic. To check the statistical significance of these results we interact each of the variables in equation (1) with a variable equal to the C_SCORE t-1 quintile. In untabulated results, the coefficient on C_SCORE_ quintile *RET*DR is positive (0.0960) and statistically significant at the 1% level across the 20 years (t = 9.59). These results confirm that our partitioning on predicted conservatism based on C_SCORE is successful in partitioning firms by their subsequent asymmetric timeliness.
Validation of C_SCORE
Descriptive statistics
In Table 4 , we present descriptive statistics for the C_SCORE groups, each of which contains approximately 15,400 firm-years. Within each C_SCORE group we separately identify the observations where the negative special items are at least 0.5 percent of sales, and also have become more negative relative to last year by at least 0.5 percent, which constitute our primary sample in subsequent tests. The first sort ensures that the negative special items we study represent significant earnings components.
However, certain firms are likely to report significantly negative special items because of the nature of their business. Of greater interest are cases when special items are significantly more negative than even those reported in the prior year. Hence we impose the second requirement that the special items as a percentage of sales have declined by 0.5 percentage points. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on both the sample 14,294
firm-years reporting large negative special items, or primary sample (columns labeled "Yes"), and other firm-years (columns labeled "No") within each C_SCORE group.
Panel A in Table 4 reports the firm characteristics by C_SCORE quintile. As expected, across the five quintiles of C_SCORE, mean and median equity value are declining, while mean and median leverage as well as book-to-market are increasing.
Relative to other firms within each C_SCORE group, our primary sample of largenegative-special-item reporters consists of slightly larger firms. Mean and median BTM and LEV for the two samples within each C_SCORE group are similar.
Panel B of Table 4 also displays the percentage of firms in each group that reported losses, negative special items and negative special items that were at least 0.5% of sales in the previous year. In general, a higher percentage of firms in the high C_SCORE groups reported losses in the prior year. However, results show no significant variation in the percentage of firms reporting negative special items in the prior year with C_SCORE. Further, within each C_SCORE group the relative percentages for the primary sample and other firms appear to be roughly similar. Within our primary sample of large-negative-special-item reporters, firms with higher expected conservatism do not experience negative returns more frequently than firms with lower expected conservatism. The frequency of negative returns and the median return are respectively 54.26% and -4.85% in the top C_SCORE quintile of our primary sample, while the corresponding numbers for the bottom quintile are 56.21% and -5.96%. However, firms with higher expected conservatism tend to report earnings losses more frequently than firms with lower expected conservatism. The frequency of losses and the median earnings as a percentage of sales are respectively 72.31% and -4.35% in the top C_SCORE quintile of our primary sample, while the corresponding numbers for the bottom quintile are 35.96% and 3.91%. This is consistent with the earnings of firms reporting large negative special items in the highest C_SCORE quintile being more responsive to negative returns.
We do not find that the frequency of firms reporting significantly large magnitudes and declines in negative special items in the lowest C_SCORE quintile (21%) is any lower than that in the highest C_SCORE quintile (18%). The mean and median special items of firms in the primary sample also do not appear to vary much with predicted conservatism. They are respectively -11.44% and -3.92% for firms in the lowest C_SCORE quintile and -10.39% and -3.93% for firms in the highest. Firms in the primary sample also exhibit little variation in the decline in special items as a percentage of sales with predicted conservatism.
In summary, firms reporting significantly large negative special items in the lowest C_SCORE quintile experience negative returns that are no lower in frequency and magnitude than similar firms in the highest C_SCORE quintile. Although the firms with lower expected conservatism report less severe losses and lower declines in net income, their frequency and magnitude of negative special items do not appear to be any less than firms with high expected conservatism.
Results
Results on return timeliness
In this section, we examine the extent to which negative special items are asymmetrically timely in capturing the information in contemporaneous negative returns compared to positive returns. Thus, even though firms in the lowest C_SCORE quintile report large negative special items (by selection), their special items do not exhibit asymmetric covariance with contemporaneously received bad news.
The coefficient on RET t-1 *DR t-1 (i.e., γ 2 ) exhibits a similar pattern across the five C_SCORE quintiles. In the top quintile, special items exhibit significant asymmetric timeliness with respect to lagged returns. The coefficient on RET t-1 *DR t-1 in the top C_SCORE quintile (0.1577) is statistically significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) , who note that while the recognition of bad news in earnings is timelier than that of good news, it is still not likely to be immediate.
However, the estimated asymmetric timeliness of special items with respect to lagged returns declines as one moves from the highest to the lowest C_SCORE quintile. In the lowest C_SCORE quintile, the coefficient on RET t-1 *DR t-1 (0.0096) is statistically insignificant. In summary, the special items in the lowest quintile do not appear to be significantly asymmetrically associated with either contemporaneous bad news or bad news received in the last year.
To check the significance of the positive relation between C_SCORE quintile and asymmetric timeliness observed in Panel A of Our results thus demonstrate that the negative special items reported by firms with high predicted conservatism are more likely to be timely recognitions of contemporaneously received bad news. Further, more conservative firms are also timelier in recognizing negative special items in response to bad news received in the previous period.
Persistence results
The persistence of special items
The evidence in the previous section suggests that large negative special items reported by firms with low C_SCOREs are unlikely to be loss capitalizations. We next test for systematic variation in the persistence of large negative special items across C_SCORE quintiles. Basu (1997) uses the following specification to test for persistence of earnings:
where
We separate earnings into two components:
SI t represents special items in period t and OI t represents operating income before special items. Substituting the above expression for E t in regression (9), we get the following specification:
More transitory earnings components will lead to more negative α and β coefficients in regression (6). In particular, β captures the transience of special items. If β is indistinguishable from zero, any decrease in the special items component (that is, any increase in the magnitude of negative special items) in period t decreases income permanently, with the result that the period t decrease does not reverse in period t+1. A negative β indicates that a portion of the decrease in negative special items in period t reverses in period t+1. When β equals -1, the decrease in negative special items in period t reverses completely in period t+1, and the special items are fully transitory. Burgstahler et al (2002) argue that when β is more negative than -1, then any period t decrease in negative special items reverses more-than-proportionately in period t+1, consistent with managers taking "earnings baths" in period t to generate increased earnings in the next year. Note that β < -1 is also consistent with special items in the current year being associated with managerial actions that generate improved profitability in the next year such as discontinuation of unprofitable projects. In general, given that the negative special items that are the focus of our analysis are reasonably large (around -11% of sales on average), it is possible that they include some earnings baths across all reporting firms, irrespective of expected conservatism. 
6 In additional analysis, we do not observe the same systematic pattern in significantly large positive special items persistence across C_SCORE quintiles, where we investigate positive special items that are at least 0.5% of sales and have increased over last year's by 0.5 percent points. Note that our hypothesis, based on the arguments in Ball (2001) and Watts (2003) , have no implications for the persistence of positive special items.
In the above regression, all variables are as previously defined. α 1 and β 1 capture variation in the persistence of operating income and special items respectively with the quintile rank of C_SCORE. Model 1 presents the basic persistence regression for the overall sample of firm-years reporting large negative special items. In Model 2 the coefficient on C_SCORE t-1 _quintile*ΔSI/P is significantly negative, indicating a statistically significant negative relation between the persistence of special items and predicted conservatism. Further, the coefficient on C_SCORE t-1 _quintile*ΔSI/P is much more negative than that on C_SCORE t-1 _quintile*ΔOI/P, indicating that variation in the persistence of special items with C_SCORE is more pronounced that of operating income.
Interestingly, both Panels A and Panels B also reveal a negative association between persistence of operating income OI and C_SCORE. The results in Panels C and D of Table 6 suggest that for the higher quintiles of C_SCORE, the lower persistence of OI is due to components in OI that capture bad news in a timely manner. More importantly, because OI persistence does not vary systematically with C_SCORE for firms-years with ΔOI > 0, the results are inconsistent with the explanation that some unspecified factor causes the persistence of all earnings components to decline with C_SCORE.
Persistence results excluding firm-years close to earnings benchmarks
The documented negative association of predicted conservatism with negative special items persistence can, in part, be due to the former's association with the extent of strategic classification of special items. As discussed in the hypothesis development section, greater pressure to reverse losses recognized via special items can restrict managers in more conservative firms from strategically classifying recurring operating expenses as special. However, another possibility is that firms close to benchmarks are more likely to engaging in strategic special items classification (MacVay 2006) , and the incentives to just meet or beat earnings benchmarks are associated with our predicted conservatism measure. 7 In this section, we examine this explanation by investigating whether the cross-sectional variation in negative-special-items persistence with predicted conservatism is driven by firms close to earnings benchmarks commonly discussed in the literature.
To determine whether the association between current special items and future operating income is driven solely by the proximity to earnings targets, we identify firms whose earnings meet or just beat either previous year's earnings or zero. Meeting or beating is defined as earnings scaled by sales exceed either previous year's sales-scaled earnings or zero by 0.5 percent points. These firms are excluded from the sample. We further exclude firms whose net income is negative but their operating income excluding special items is positive. Moreover, we exclude from the sample firm-years with negative change in net income but positive change in operating income. In the above firm-years, recurring items could conceivably have been reclassified as special to convert net losses into operating profits, or net income decreases into operating income increases. 8 The excluded observations thus represent firm-years where the incentives to engage in strategic special-items classification are expected to be especially pronounced.
The survey evidence in Graham et al (2005) indicates that firm executives are particularly concerned about meeting or exceeding previous period's earnings and also consider reporting losses undesirable. Table 7 reports results of estimating the same persistence regressions as in Table   6 (regression 11) for the reduced sample of 8,713 firm-years. The coefficient on ΔSI/P is uniformly negative across all five quintiles and increasing in magnitude across the five quintiles, from -0.4403 in the lowest quintile of C_SCORE to -0.9306 in the top quintile.
The coefficient on ΔSI/P in the top C_SCORE quintile is statistically indistinguishable from -1, suggesting the negative special items in that quintile are completely transitory.
For a reduced sample of firm-years with data available on analyst forecasts, we identify firm-years that are close to meeting consensus forecasts, instead of previous year's earnings. In untabulated results, we find a similar negative association between predicted conservatism and negative special items persistence after excluding firm-years that just meet or beat analyst forecasts as well.
Overall our evidence suggests that more conservative firms, by being timelier in recognizing and responding to losses, exhibit a lower persistence of negative special items. Our evidence does not rule out a negative cross-sectional association between predicted conservatism and the propensity of managers to strategically classify persistent expenses as special. However, it does indicate that the variation in special items persistence we document cannot be driven by firm-years just meeting or beating important earnings benchmarks.
The association between special items declines and future sales changes
We attribute the cross-sectional variation in special items persistence observed in the previous section, at least partially, to timelier managerial response in more conservative firms to unsuccessful projects. In our analysis so far, we investigate whether strategic reporting can explain all the evidence on variation in special items persistence by examining firms not close to earnings benchmarks. In this section, we extend our analysis by testing the association between current special items and a component of future net income unlikely to be affected by strategic reporting: future sales.
Recall that strategic classification of special items involves the misclassification of recurring operating expenses as special, thus generating a reduction in reported operating expenses in the current period. Strategic one-time "earnings baths" involve excessive booking of special charges such as restructuring charges etc, with the objective of generating reductions in future expenses. Thus, strategic reporting is hypothesized to primarily affect expenses, and not revenues. If the negative special items in more conservative firms are associated with timelier termination of unprofitable projects, we expect that current special items declines will be associated with a decline in the scale of operations. Hence, we expect current special items declines to be associated with future sales declines among more conservative firms.
For completeness, we also examine the relation between current special items and another component of future net income, future operating expenses. If the negative special items of more conservative firms indeed represent the termination of inefficient projects, then in addition to being associated with future sales declines, they should also be associated with declines in future operating expenses. We test this proposition by estimating the following two regressions for every C_SCORE quintile:
ΔSales t+1 /P t-1 = k + α*ΔOI t / P t -2 + β*ΔSI t / P t -2 + ε t (13)
In regression (13), when the coefficient on ΔSI/P is more positive, current special items declines are more highly associated with sales declines in the next period. In regression (14), OPEX represents operating expenses computed as Sales -OI, where OI is operating income or income excluding special items. Given the sign conventions, a more positive coefficient on ΔSI/P would imply that current special items declines are more highly associated with declines in operating expenses in the next period. Table 8 , Panels A and B respectively present the results of estimating regressions (13) and (14) for every quintile of C_SCORE. As Panel A demonstrates, we do not observe a significant association between current special items declines and future sales declines in any predicted conservatism quintile other than the top quintile. Among firms in the top C_SCORE quintile, the coefficient on ΔSI/P is positive and statistically significant at 5% level. The coefficient implies that a single-standard-deviation decline in current ΔSI/P is associated with a decrease of 0.0791 in future ΔSales/P. This appears to be an economically significant amount, relative to mean future ΔSales/P of 0.0545.
Panel B presents a similar lack of association between current special items declines and future operating expense declines in any predicted conservatism quintile other than the top quintile. Among firms in the top C_SCORE quintile, the coefficient on ΔSI/P is positive and statistically significant at 5% level. The coefficient implies that a single-standard-deviation decline in current ΔSI/P is associated with a decrease of 0.0665 in future ΔOPEX/P. This appears to be an economically significant amount, given that mean future ΔOPEX/P is 0.0401. 9 Collectively the evidence in this section is consistent with the negative special items of firms with the greatest expected conservatism being the most highly associated with the termination of unprofitable projects.
Additional analysis: special items type
In this section, we focus on two main types of special items: restructuring charges, and write-offs, including fixed asset write-downs and goodwill impairments.
Restructuring charges and write-offs are expense items whose recognition is motivated by expected losses in future cash flows. Thus, they are the charges most likely to be associated with managerial actions to prevent further losses. These charges also tend to be large in magnitude, and involve substantial discretion in their estimation. If less conservative firms are also less timely in discontinuing unprofitable projects, they are expected to report more persistent restructuring charges and write-offs.
COMPUSTAT provides data for different types of special items starting in fiscalyear 2001. Our analysis includes two broad types of special items: restructuring charges, fixed asset write-downs and goodwill impairments, collectively referred to as "CHARGES" and other special items collectively referred to as "OSI".
10 Table 9 Panel A breaks out types of special items by C_SCORE quintile within the sample of firm-years that report significantly negative levels and changes in special items over the four years from 2001 to 2004. We observe that restructuring charges and write-offs account for around 54-61% of the dollar value of large negative special items across all five quintiles of C_SCORE over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Further, between 62-68% of firm-years in every C_SCORE quintile report either a restructuring charge or an 10 COMPUSTAT reports certain other specific types of special items after 2001, for example, in process-R&D, litigation settlement costs, etc. Because these individual types tend to be much less frequent in the data relative to asset write-offs and restructuring charges, we pool them together as "other special items." asset write-off. We also report the break-down of CHARGES into restructuring charges and write-offs. As a percentage of total special items, firms in the top C_SCORE quintiles report more write-offs, and those in the bottom quintiles tend report more restructuring charges. This breakdown should be interpreted with caution, as COMPUSTAT extracts certain write-offs included in restructuring charges by the company and reports them as asset write-downs when they have sufficient data to do so.
Hence, the distinction between the two types is somewhat ambiguous.
For the sample of 4,053 firm-years with data available on special items type, Table 9 Panel B reports the result of estimating the following persistence regression:
where ΔCHARGES t-1 is the change in the restructuring charges and write-offs, and ΔOSI t-1 is the change in the other special items. The regression model is conceptually similar to regression (11), but we also decompose the change in special items into the change in restructuring charges and write-offs, and change in other special items.
Since data on special items type is available only between the years 2001 and 2004, there would only be four observations if we were to estimate the regression using the Fama-Macbeth procedure. Consequently, we estimate the regression using a pooled design, with t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered within every year, to allow for cross-sectional correlation within a given year.
Panel B of Table 9 demonstrates that on average, restructuring charges and writeoffs tend to be more reverting than other special items. The coefficient on ΔCHARGES is more negative than that on ΔOSI for every C_SCORE quintile. More importantly, in the top three quintiles of C_SCORE the coefficients on ΔCHARGES are between -1.21 and -1.26 and statistically indistinguishable from -1, that is, the charges are completely reverting. In the lowest quintile of C_SCORE, restructuring charges and write-offs are less transitory. The coefficient on ΔCHARGES is -0.6722, significantly lower than -1 at the 5% level, for firm-years in the lowest C_SCORE quintile.
Our results thus provide evidence consistent with the restructuring charges and write-offs of less conservative firms representing less-than-complete recognition of expected losses, with the consequence that the charges are more persistent. From a financial-analysis standpoint, our results indicate that knowing special items type is not sufficient to form an opinion about the future persistence of the item. Expected conservatism causes variation in persistence within special items type.
Conclusion
We examine the relation between special-item persistence and predicted conservatism. Our main findings are as follows. Firms with higher predicted conservatism are no more likely to report large-negative special items as firms with low predicted conservatism. However, the negative special items of firms with higher predicted conservatism are more highly correlated with recent negative returns and exhibit lower persistence. The variation in negative-special-items persistence with predicted conservatism does not appear to reflect a variation in all earnings components.
Neither can it be completely explained by a variation in strategic classification of recurring expenses as special in order to meet earnings targets. Finally, the negative special items of the firms with greatest expected conservatism are the most highly associated with future sales declines, as well as future operating expense declines.
These results have implications for future earnings prediction and enhance our understanding of the implications of asymmetric timeliness of earnings for managerial actions. With regard to future earnings prediction, our research highlights that an awareness of a firm's accounting policy (in particular, the asymmetric verification standards for good news versus bad news) can assist investors in understanding the timeseries properties of earnings, an important input for valuation.
Conservatism, defined in this paper as a more stringent verification standard for the recognition of gains compared to losses, implies a stronger correlation of current earnings with negative news than positive news (asymmetric timeliness). As a result, the recognition of losses arising from unprofitable projects occurs in a timelier manner, instead of being spread out over time. This makes negative special items, which include these timely loss recognitions via asset write-downs and restructuring charges, more transitory. Further, to the extent that managerial compensation is often directly or indirectly linked to earnings, the timely recognition of losses also provides managers incentives to take actions to reverse these losses, inducing quicker reversion of negative special items. Thus, examining cross-sectional variation in negative special items persistence facilitates a better understanding of how managerial response to adverse circumstances is tied to accounting policy. 
Variable Definition E t
Income before extraordinary items.
Market value of equity at the end of year t-1. RET t 12-month buy-and-hold returns beginning the fourth month of the fiscal year.
LEV t-1
Leverage computed as the ratio of long-term debt book value of equity at the end of year t-1.
BTM t-1
The ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the end of year t-1.
Natural log of market value of equity in millions at the end of year t-1. -0.005) . DR is a binary indicator variable equal to one when annual return RET < zero. LOSS is a binary indicator variable equal to one when annual earnings E < zero. PAST_LOSS, PAST_SI-and PAST_SI_large-are binary indicator variables equal to one if the firm has reported respectively a loss, a negative special item or a large negative special item in the previous year. Please see Table 1 for descriptions of the remaining variables. DR t is a binary indicator variable equal to one when annual year t return RET t is less than zero. Please see Table 1 for descriptions of the other variables. Table 3 describes the computation of C_SCORE. Panel A presents time-series average coefficients from yearly regressions of net income on operating income and special items within each C_SCORE t-1 quintile. Panel B presents time-series average coefficients from yearly regressions of net income on operating income and special items that incorporate an interactive variable (C_SCORE t-1 _quintile) for the predicted-conservatism quintile. Panel C (Panel D) repeats the analysis in Panel A, but only includes firm years where ΔOI t /P t-2 > 0 (ΔOI t /P t-2 < 0). Additional variables are defined as follows: ΔE t+1 is the change in income t+1 , computed as E t+1 -E t . ΔOI t is the change in operating income, where operating income is E t -SI t . ΔSI t is the change in SI t , computed as SI t -SI t-1 . P t is the market value of equity at the end of year t. Panels are estimated using Fama-Macbeth regressions. Total number of firm-year observations is 14,294. < -0.005 ) are divided into quintiles based on their predicted conservatism, C_SCORE t-1 . Firm-years whose net income scaled by sales and change in scaled net income is greater than 0 but less than 0.005 are excluded. So are firm-years that report negative net income but positive income before special items (or operating income), and negative change in net income but positive change in operating income. Table 3 describes the computation of C_SCORE. The following table presents time-series average coefficients from yearly regressions of net income on operating income and special items within each C_SCORE t-1 quintile. ΔE t+1 is the change in income t+1 , computed as E t+1 -E t . ΔOI t is the change in operating income, where operating income is E t -SI t . ΔSI t is the change in SI t , computed as SI t -SI t-1 . P t is the market value of equity at the end of year t. Panels are estimated using Fama-Macbeth regressions. Total number of firm-year observations is 8,713. Table 3 describes the computation of C_SCORE. Panel A presents time-series average coefficients from yearly regressions of year-ahead sales on current operating income and special items within each C_SCORE t-1 quintile. Panel B presents time-series average coefficients from yearly regressions of year-ahead operating expenses (OPEX t+1 ) on current operating income and special items within each C_SCORE t-1 quintile. OPEX t+1 is defined as Sales t+1 -OI t+1 . Panels are estimated using FamaMacbeth regressions. Total number of firm-year observations is 14,294. Table 3 describes the computation of C_SCORE. Statistics on magnitude and frequency are reported in Panel A. The '% of firms reporting' statistic gives the percentage of firms with large negative special items that report a special item of the given type. Panel B reports the results of pooled-time-series, cross-sectional regressions by C_SCORE quintile. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors.
Variable Definition
SI
Special items Restruc
Restructuring Costs
